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Abstract
Differences in firm-level productivity explain international activities of non-financial
firms quite well. We test whether differences in bank productivity determine international
activities of banks. Based on a dataset that allows tracking banks across countries and
across different modes of foreign entry, we model the ordered probability of maintaining
a commercial presence abroad and the volume of banks’ international assets empirically.
Our research has three main findings. First, more productive banks are more likely to enter
foreign markets in increasingly complex modes. Second, more productive banks also hold
larger volumes of foreign assets. Third, higher risk aversion renders entry less likely, but it
increases the volume of foreign activities conditional upon entry.
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1. Introduction
Large, internationally active banks are important channels for the integration
of financial markets. But they can also contribute to the propagation of shocks
across borders. 1 The importance of global banks raises a number of questions.
Are banks’ internationalization decisions, as for non-financial firms, determined
by productivity? Which factors affect the extensive margin (the foreign investment
decision) and the intensive margin (the volume of activities)? And how do banks
decide on the particular mode of foreign activities (international assets, foreign
branches, foreign subsidiaries)? We answer these questions using a unique dataset
and extend prior literature by explicitly modeling the role played by productivity,
size, risk, other bank-specific, and country-specific factors. 2
The international trade literature shows that larger and more productive non-
financial firms are more likely to export and to engage in foreign direct investment
(FDI). 3 The reason is that more productive firms find it easier to pay the higher
fixed and variable costs of foreign market entry compared to domestic operations
(??). Only productive firms self-select into increasingly fixed-cost intensive foreign
modes of entry because their lower variable cost due to high productivity imply
additional profits from abroad.
So far, applications to international banking are rare. This paper extends existing
literature on cross-border banking in three regards. First, we theoretically model
the internationlization decision of banks as a function of productivity and risk. We
show that, both, the decision to enter a foreign market (the extensive margin) and
1 ? show how the degree of internationalization of banks affects the transmission of mon-
etary policy shocks.
2 See, for example, ?, ?, ?, ?, or ?.
3 See, for example, ?, ?, ?, ?, and ?.
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the decision on the volume of activities (the intensive margin) are affected by bank
productivity.
Empirically, we draw on a comprehensive dataset about the internationalization
choices of all German banks. Most previous studies are confined to large, interna-
tionally active banks, thereby neglecting the selection of banks into foreign markets
and the ensuing bias. The “External Position Report” of the Deutsche Bundesbank
contains information about the international assets of all German banks, their for-
eign branches, and their foreign subsidiaries, year-by-year, and country-by-country.
Bank risk aversion is measured by supervisory financial accounts data.
Second, we model the fixed cost of international banking by using an ordered
probit model. To model self-selection of banks into the different modes of foreign
activities, we enrich a conventional ? model and include hierarchical categories
in the selection equation. This method may be relevant for studies of non-financial
international firms as well (?). We use the 2011 version of the capital account open-
ness indicator of ? and information on WTO bilateral trade agreements as exclusion
restrictions to predict the self-selection of banks into foreign markets.
Third, we account for the endogenous relationship between banks’ factor de-
mand and productivity by using the approaches of ? and ?. These estimators are
frequently used in non-financial firm studies, but they are rarely applied to banks. 4
We use detailed financial accounts data reported to the supervisor to estimate bank
productivity. When adapting the production function estimators to banks, we ex-
ploit supervisory information about all bank exits through mergers to identify pro-
ductivity.
4 Exceptions are ? and ?. Most banking studies use a dual (cost function) approach (?).
This approach neglects the bias due to the simultaneity between input choices and produc-
tivity.
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Our main results are as follows. First, as regards the extensive margin of in-
ternationalization, banks and non-banks differ. In contrast to non-financial firms,
many (small) banks hold international assets. In line with evidence for non-financial
firms, only very few banks have foreign affiliates. Productivity is especially impor-
tant for entry choices of smaller banks such as savings and cooperatives. Second,
more productive banks have larger volumes of international activities. This result
is not driven by size effects, and it is robust to using alternative proxies for pro-
ductivity. Correcting for the selection into different foreign modes has a significant
impact on the volume of activities. Consequently, studies considering only a sub-
sample of banks to analyze internationalization are likely to suffer from selection
bias. Third, banks with a higher revealed degree of risk aversion are less likely to
go abroad. But, conditional on foreign presence, the volume of their activities is
larger.
In Section 2, we derive theoretical hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data,
the empirical model, and the measurement of bank productivity. We discuss the
estimation results in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5.
2. Theoretical hypotheses
We consider a simple, static portfolio model to analyze how bank-level produc-
tivity and the degree of risk aversion influence international banking choices. A
static model allows separating more clearly the effects of productivity inspired by
the goods trade literature from risk considerations central to conventional bank-
ing models, which is our focus. It comes at the expense that we do not model exit
choices explicitly. Our approach amounts to the assumption that the fixed costs as-
sociated with entry and exit are sunk after each period. Whereas this assumption
4
is in line with many entry/exit choice problems (??), recent IO literature models
market entry and exit choices as dynamic games (??).
We assume that banks can be active abroad either by holding foreign assets
through their domestic headquarters (Mode 1) or through foreign affiliates (Mode
2).
We assume that banks invest but do not borrow abroad. 5 In each period, a repre-
sentative bank chooses its optimal portfolio structure. The balance sheet restriction
for bank i is:
Wi+Di = Li+L∗i j +Ri, (1)
where Wi is initial wealth, Di are domestic deposits (liabilities), Li are domestic
loans (assets), L∗ are foreign loans (assets) in country j, and Ri are risk-free assets.
The expected profit of a domestic bank i holding international assets in country
j depends on the returns on domestic and international assets less variable costs
and the fixed costs of foreign activities:
Π(1)i j =
[
rL− ci j,L(ωi)
]
L(1)i+
[
(1− τi)r∗j,L− c∗i j,L(ωi)
]
L(1)∗i j (2)
+ rFR(1)i−
[
rD− ci j,D(ωi)
]
D(1)i−F (1) j ,
where F(1) j are the fixed costs of Mode 1, rL and rD are interest rates on (risky)
assets and liabilities, rF is the risk-free rate, τ j denotes country-specific information
costs that lower the return on international assets, with 0 < τ j < 1, and ci j are
variable costs. The index (1) in this equation denotes the bank’s profit function
under Mode 1. The fixed and variable costs of international operations vary across
host countries. The fixed costs of domestic operations are normalized to 0.
5 Relaxing these assumptions leaves the main qualitative results of the following analysis
unaffected.
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In this static model, banks consider only contemporaneous profits. The upshot
in dynamic structural models, such as ? and ?, is that agents learn about the fixed
costs associated with entry and exit, and thus expected profits. Fixed costs can take
different forms. They can be related to the periodical renewal of banking charters
for foreign subsidiaries, or they can capture fixed costs due to allocating staff and
other resources to maintaining country expertise. Fixed costs of exiting markets are
not modeled because we observe hardly any retreat from a market by banks in our
sample once the bank operates an affiliate in a country. In the empirical estimation
below, we explicitly account for the possibility that parent banks cease to exist in
the German home market by specifying exit through mergers when estimating bank
productivity as in ?.
Raising deposits and granting loans is costly. These costs reflect the resource
inputs connected to handling loan applications, maintaining a branch network, and
performing payment services. We assume that banks differ with regard to their
productivity (ωi) and that more productive banks incur lower costs:
ci j, = ci j, (ωi) with
∂ci j,
∂ωi
< 0. (3)
Each bank thus has a specific productivity level that transfers also to its foreign
affiliates. The costs of supplying financial services abroad exceed those at home.
Hence, ci j,L(ωi)< c∗i j,L(ωi), holds due to the institutional and regulatory differences
across financial systems and lack of familiarity with the pool of foreign borrowers.
The profits of a bank that establishes foreign affiliates (Mode 2) are then:
Π(2)i j =
[
rL− ci j,L(ωi)
]
L(2)i+
[
r∗j,L− c∗i j,L(ωi)
]
L(2)∗i j (4)
+ rFR(2)i−
[
rD− ci j,D(ωi)
]
D(2)i−F (2) j
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This specification is similar to Equation (2) with two exceptions. First, we assume
that the fixed costs of operating under Mode 2 are higher than the fixed costs of
Mode 1, F(1) j < F(2) j (?). Intuitively, the fixed cost associated with (re-)applying
for a banking charter for a foreign affiliate are likely larger compared to those as-
sociated with operating a country desk for cross-border lending activities.
Second, information costs are lower under Mode 2, because the bank is operat-
ing in a foreign country. We treat information cost in banking as the analogue of
melting iceberg transportation cost in the trade literature. This approach is in line
with theoretical and empirical banking literature that emphasizes two traits of in-
formation generation cost in banking. Greater geographical distance between banks
and customers implies higher cost of acquiring and generating private information
(??). Moreover, information generation technology is directly related to bank pro-
ductivity and, hence, marginal cost and profits (???). Without loss of generality,
we set these costs to zero for Mode 2. Our specification thus involves a trade-off
between the fixed and variable costs of foreign activities, similar to that in the trade
literature.
The main difference between banks and non-financial firms is that banks care
about the risk of their activities. We follow ? and assume an objective function that
increases with expected profits and decreases with risk: 6
U =U
[
E(Πi j),σ2
(
Πi j
)]
,
∂U
∂E(Πi j)
> 0,
∂U
∂σ2
(
Πi j
) < 0 (5)
Under the simplifying assumption that deposits carry no risk, the variance of the
portfolio is σ2(Πi j)=L2i σ2+L∗2i σ∗2+2×LiL∗i jCOVj, where σ2(σ∗2j ) is the country-
specific risk of domestic (foreign) assets, and COVj is the covariance matrix of
6 Empirically, we gauge different aspects of bank risk with so-called CAMEL-covariates,
which is short for capitalization, asset quality, management quality, earnings, and liquidity.
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domestic and foreign returns.
We use this model to analyze the intensive and extensive margins of banks’ for-
eign activities. For the extensive margin, the bank chooses to be active in the foreign
country if its expected utility is positive, that is, if U > 0 holds. Using Equations
(3)–(5), one can show that the probability of investing abroad is higher with lower
fixed costs of foreign activity (Fj), lower information costs (τ j), higher bank pro-
ductivity (ω j), and lower risk of foreign activities (σ∗2j ). Banks prefer Mode 2 over
Mode 1 if their productivity exceeds a threshold (ω¯) and if the savings in the fixed
costs associated with entering through Mode 2 are small relative to the higher vari-
able costs under Mode 1. Thus, banks with ωi < ω¯ choose Mode 1, but banks with
ωi > ω¯ choose Mode 2 and maintain affiliates abroad.
We analyze the volume of international activities, the intensive margin, by dif-
ferentiating the objective function with respect to international risky assets (L∗i j): 7
∂U
∂L∗i j
=
∂U
∂E(Πi j)
[
(1− τi)r∗j,L− c∗i j,L(ωi)
]
(6)
+
∂U
∂σ2
(
Πi j
) [L∗2i j σ∗2j +LiCOVj]= 0.
We denote the degree of the banks’ risk aversion as λi =−12 ∂U∂E(Πi j) +
∂U
∂σ2(Πi j)
> 0
and rewrite the first-order condition from Equation (6) as
∂U
∂L∗i j
=
∂U
∂E(Πi j)
{[
(1− τi)r∗j,L− c∗i j,L(ωi)
]
+
1
λi
[
L∗2i j σ
∗2
j +LiCOVj
]}
= 0. (7)
With Equation (7), it is straightforward to show that banks will increase the volume
of their international assets when they experience higher gross returns (r∗L), lower
7 We omit indices because results are qualitatively identical across different modes.
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information costs (τ j), higher productivity and thus lower variable costs (c∗i j,L(ωi)),
lower risk (σ∗2j ), lower correlations between domestic and foreign returns (lower
COVj), and lower degrees of risk aversion (λi). Table 1 summarizes the results of
the comparative static. 8
– Insert Table 1 around here. –
3. Data and empirical methodology
Bringing the above theoretical considerations to the data and testing in partic-
ular whether banks’ international expansion strategies are driven by productivity
and risk aversion, requires detailed data. This section describes how we model the
internationalization of banks, their bank-specific characteristics, and the features of
foreign markets as potential investment locations.
3.1. Data about bank internationalization
We analyze the patterns of bank internationalization using a unique and detailed
database on banks‘ international assets, the so-called External Position Report filed
by Deutsche Bundesbank (?). The dataset provides comprehensive information
about the international assets of domestic banks, their foreign branches, and their
foreign subsidiaries, year-by-year and country-by-country. We study the database
for the pre-crisis years 2002–2006. We deliberately choose 2006 as the end point of
our sample because we do not want our results to be affected by adjustment during
8 The assumption that a bank transfers its productivity abroad may seem at odds with the
evidence in ?, who show that foreign banks are less efficient than domestic banks. The
optimization in our model entails a comparison among domestic banks at home regarding
their choice to go abroad and not between domestic and foreign banks abroad.
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the crisis. The start of our sample is January 2002, which is when reporting thresh-
olds for international assets were abolished. Therefore, we have exact information
about the extensive and intensive margin of banks‘ foreign operations, and we do
not face any problems related to truncation or censoring.
To obtain information about the extensive margin of banks‘ foreign operations,
we manually link branches and subsidiaries located in country j to their domes-
tic parent bank i. To obtain information on the intensive margin, we aggregate all
assets held in country j across the different modes of foreign activity. We use aggre-
gate foreign asset and do not distinguish between different types of assets to keep
the analysis tractable. Most of the assets we include are interbank assets. We also
complement the External Position Report with information from the annual balance
sheets and income statements of all banks operating in Germany between 2000 and
2006. 9 Each bank that holds a German banking license must submit these data to
the supervisory authorities.
We complement these proprietary data with publicly available macro data, which
are described in Appendix B. The unbalanced panel contains observations for each
bank (i = 2,226), each destination country ( j = 35), and each year (t = 5).
In terms of country coverage, our data include members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as non-OECD coun-
tries and yields a comprehensive picture of German banks‘ foreign activities. 10
We distinguish four modes of operation: (i) purely domestic banks without foreign
activities (Mode 0), (ii) banks that hold international assets through their domestic
9 We use bank-level data back to 2000 because we require lagged information to estimate
productivity.
10 All banks with a German banking license have to report these data. We observe 2,235
banks that report at least total assets to the Bundesbank. We exclude nine banks from the
sample because of missing data. These are all small banks with no international activities.
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headquarters (Mode 1), (iii) banks that maintain foreign branches (Mode 2a), and
(iv) banks that maintain foreign subsidiaries and/or foreign branches (Mode 2b).
Each bank-year-country observation is included in only one mode. The modes
are therefore mutually exclusive. The ranking of modes follows the fixed costs in-
volved: Subsidiaries are legally independent, hold their own equity, and are subject
to host-country control, so they demand the highest capital costs and regulatory
burden. In addition, they often enable large-scale retail operations, which implies
fixed costs over and above the regulatory start-up costs (?).
– Insert Table 2 around here. –
Table 2 and Figure 1 highlight four main characteristics of the internationalization
patterns of German banks: First, observations are very dispersed across modes of
internationalization with many zeros (73%) in the bilateral matrix (Columns 1 and
3 of Table 2). Approximately 27% of the observations are in the category of in-
ternational assets. Only a few banks have foreign affiliates. Hence, the number of
observations in Modes 2a and 2b (affiliates) is tiny, accounting for less than 1% of
the total. 11
Second, because we treat each bank in each country as a separate observation,
the data are inflated. Determining whether a particular bank is active abroad pro-
duces quite a different picture (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). On average, only 19
of a total of 2,226 banks are purely domestic, 27 maintain foreign branches, and
37 use subsidiaries and/or branches. The largest group by far consists of banks that
hold international assets in at least one foreign country (2,143). This is in contrast
11 Sparse bilateral trade matrices are common also in non-banking studies and are not per
se an econometric problem. One concern could be a poor discriminatory power of the selec-
tion equation. But pseudo-R2 (Table 6) and unreported areas under the receiver operating
characteristics curve are fairly high in our sample.
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to manufacturing firms, of which only a small subset of firms export or import.
Third, even the large banks with international affiliates operate in only a very
few countries (Table 2, Column 5). German banks have branches in an average of
only 1.4 countries. Banks with subsidiaries are on average active in 3 countries.
– Insert Figure 1 around here. –
Fourth, in terms of the volume of international assets (the intensive margin),
those held through domestic banks (Mode 1) and those held through foreign branches
(Mode 2a) are of almost similar importance (Figure 1). The share of international
assets held in foreign subsidiaries (Mode 2b) is small. The patterns in the data are
similar for mean investments. Comparing the mean and median investment in each
mode reveals a substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks. In Mode 1 (in-
ternational assets), for example, the mean investment is AC8.6 million, though the
median is only AC0.14 million. This shows that the data are driven by a few, large
players.
In sum, the data paint a nuanced picture of German bank internationalization.
Many banks hold international assets in at least one foreign country. But only few
have foreign affiliates, and these banks dominate the aggregate numbers.
3.2. Estimation method
With the data at hand, we can now model the internationalization of banks using
a self-selection model in the spirit of ?. Similar to ?, we replace the conventional
selection equation with an ordered probit model to account for the hierarchy of
modes of activities. The extensive margin (EM) reflects the discrete decision of
banks whether and through which mode to be present in a foreign market. Condi-
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tional on foreign presence, the bank chooses then the volume of foreign activity,
the intensive margin (IM). Our model of bank i‘s operation in country j in year t
takes the following form:
EMi jt = αXi jt +βZi jt + vi jt (8a)
IMi jt = γXi jt +σIMui jt , (8b)
where σIM is the standard error of the intensive margin‘s error term and Z is a vector
of exclusion restrictions to identify the extensive and the intensive margin (?). The
error terms u and v are assumed to follow a standard bivariate normal distribution
with mean zero, unit variance, and correlation ρ. 12 Errors are independent from the
covariates X and Z. Covariates in X capture productivity, other bank-level variables,
and host country-specific variables. Because we can observe the intensive margin
only if EMint > 0, and because the error terms are correlated, the ordinary least
square (OLS) estimates of γ would suffer from a selection bias.
We model the extensive margin as an ordered probit model, which yields con-
sistent coefficient estimates of α and β, as well as threshold values µ1, µ2, and µ3,
which separate the categories. The probability that a bank self-selects into one of
four mutually exclusive ordinally scaled modes is given by:
Pr
(
EMi jt = 0|Zi jt
)
=Φ
(
µ1−βZi jt
)
(9)
Pr
(
EMi jt = 1|Zi jt
)
=Φ
(
µ2a−βZi jt
)−Φ(µ1a−βZi jt)
Pr
(
EMi jt = 2a|Zi jt
)
=Φ
(
µ2b−βZi jt
)−Φ(µ2a−βZi jt)
Pr
(
EMi jt = 2b|Zi jt
)
= 1−Φ(µ2b−βZi jt)
For the probabilities to be positive, µ1 < µ2a < µ2b must hold. Thresholds can be
12 This specification allows applying a standard normal distribution in the correction term,
drawing on ?.
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interpreted as proxies for the fixed costs of foreign activity that banks must cover.
To estimate the determinants of the intensive margin, we account for the bias in-
duced by the selection of banks into the different modes by taking the conditional
expectations of the intensive margin:
E
(
IMi jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k
)
=αXi jt +σIME
[
ui jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k
]
, (10)
where k = 1,2a,2b. Assuming correlated errors across modes, we can simplify the
conditional expectations of the error term in Equation (10) to
E
(
ρvi jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k
)
= ρE
[
vi jt |µk−βZi jt < vi jt < µk+1−βZi jt
]
, (11)
which resembles the inverse Mills ratio in a standard Heckman model. 13 We re-
place the conventional selection equation by an ordered probit model. The corre-
sponding correction term λki jt , therefore, depends on the mode chosen by bank i.
The intensive margin then transforms into:
E
(
IMi jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k
)
=αXi jt +σIMρλki jt , (12)
with
λ1i jt =
φ
(
µ1−βZi jt
)−φ(µ2a−βZi jt)
Φ
(
µ2a−βZi jt
)−Φ(µ1−βZi jt) i f EMi jt = 1
λ2ai jt =
φ
(
µ2a−βZi jt
)−φ(µ2b−βZi jt)
Φ
(
µ2b−βZi jt
)−Φ(µ2a−βZi jt) i f EMi jt = 2a
λ2bi jt =
φ
(
µ2b−βZi jt
)
1−Φ(µ2b−βZi jt) i f EMi jt = 2b
The correction term specified in Equation (12) performs a function analogous to
13 See Appendix A for details.
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that of the inverse Mills ratio in a conventional sample selection model (?). Ne-
glecting this term leads to an omitted variable bias, following from the assumption
that u and v in Equations (8a) and (8b) are not independent but bivariate normally
distributed. The hierarchical modeling of the extensive margin, therefore, contains
information that affects the estimation of the intensive margin.
3.3. Measuring bank productivity
To obtain an unbiased measure of bank-level productivity (ωit), we follow the
non-financial firm literature on productivity and use the estimators of ? and ?. Bank
i‘s output Y at time t is measured by total lending. Loans are generated by using
fixed capital K and labor X1 as in ?, ?, and ?. In addition, we specify borrowed
funds X2. 14 The production function is
lnYit = a+b lnX1it+ c lnX2it+d lnKit+ lnωit+ εit. (13)
where ωit is (unobservable) productivity, and εit are error terms reflecting shocks.
Factor demand for X1,2 is variable, i.e. the bank can adjust labor and borrowed
funds after a negative output shock if, for example, loan demand collapses. Fixed
capital K is the observed state variable.
The challenge in obtaining unbiased estimates of ω follows from the simultane-
ity of productivity and factor demand. The estimators of ? and ? resolve this issue
by noting that unobservable productivity can be expressed as a function of contem-
poraneous and lagged state variables and intermediate inputs. We specify equity
14 The definition of banks’ intermediation technologies remains a matter of ongoing debate
(?). ? show that the specification of alternative outputs, such as total earning assets or de-
posits, and inputs bears little differences for productivity estimates for a sample of German
banks.
15
capital as the intermediate input used by banks. As argued by ?, this method avoids
the violation of the (often implicit) independence assumption between productivity
and the factor input choices of banks.
The estimator of ? furthermore exploits information of firm exit to identify firm-
specific productivity. In contrast to non-financial firms, banks usually do not exit
through insolvencies. The reason are potential negative externalities, such as bank
runs (?). But ongoing mergers among German banks over the last 20 years show
the consolidation in the German banking industry (?). Therefore, we prefer this
estimator and model exits through mergers and takeovers based on data obtained
from prudential supervisory reports for all German banks.
– Insert Table 3 around here. –
In Table 3, we report the parameter estimates for the production functions and sum-
marize the variables used. For comparison, we also show OLS estimates of Equa-
tion (13). Parameter estimates resemble those reported by ? for Brazilian banks and
? for German savings banks. OLS regressions highlight the severe bias in parame-
ters when we neglect the simultaneity of production choices and bank productivity.
The OLS intercept can be interpreted as a Solow productivity residual. Because the
estimate of productivity (ωi) is bank-specific, the results for the ? (OP) and the ?
(LP) estimators lack this entry. 15 In addition to productivity estimates based on
Equation (13), we also specify a plain measure of labor productivity as the number
of full-time equivalents per million of Euros of total assets as MPL.
– Insert Table 4 around here. –
Table 4 describes bank productivity and bank-level covariates for the different
15 We do not report the parameter estimate of the intermediate input (equity) in the OP
and LP specifications. Equity is an ancillary parameter, required only to obtain unbiased
estimates of productivity.
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modes of internationalization. CAMEL variables exhibit a clear pattern. More com-
plex and more costly modes of international operations are associated with a lower
degree of capitalization, lower reserve holdings, lower loan-loss provisions, lower
cost-to-income ratios, lower return on equity, and lower liquidity. These results are
in line with our theoretical priors that more productive banks are more likely to
be active internationally and choose more complex modes. Banks with a lower re-
vealed degree of risk aversion are more active internationally as well.
4. Results
Next, we analyze the likelihood that banks operate abroad in different modes
(cross-border assets, branches, or subsidiaries) as a function of bank productivity.
4.1. Identification
Estimation of Equation (8a) requires specifying macroeconomic conditions X in
country j. We also need to find variables that affect the entry of banks into specific
markets but not the volume of investment, i.e. variables that can serve as exclusion
restrictions Z. Adequate exclusion restrictions explain the probability of bank i‘s
presence in country j at time t but are uncorrelated with the volume of interna-
tional activities. Natural candidates for such exclusion restrictions are restrictions
on capital account (CA) transactions and restrictions on international trade. Table
5 summarizes the data.
– Insert Table 5 around here. –
Information on capital account openness can be obtained for each country j from
(?) in the version of the year 2011. The capital ccount index is an aggregate index
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which is coded such that larger values indicate more open capital accounts. It is
based on five different capital account items: equity transactions, money market
instruments, bonds, collective investment instruments and institutions [*** Was ist
das ? ***], foreign direct investment, and commercial bank presence. The index
is based on the “Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions (AREAER)” by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Whereas more
open capital accounts receive larger index values, a value of ”one” for individual
components indicates that restrictions on capital account transactions are in place.
To account for the fact that the internationalization of banks and non-banks are
closely related, we use information on whether a given country has a free trade
agreement with the European Union, and thus with Germany. Such an agreement
should ease the entry cost for non-financial firms, thereby increasing the likelihood
that banks follow their customers by some mode of internationalization. The exis-
tence of such agreements is exogenous to the individual bank, but is likely to affect
its entry choice.
Table 6 shows regression results for the extensive margin in Equation (8a) when
specifying aggregate indices and individual components separately and jointly. All
regressions include banking group and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the bank-country level. All variables except the dummy variables and those
expressed in percentages are in logs and are lagged by one period.
– Insert Table 6 around here. –
To put coefficient estimates into perspective, Table 7 provides elasticities for
the extensive margin. Because we use an ordered response model with discrete
outcomes to model the extensive margin, the marginal effects differ across modes
and indicate the extent of change in the probability of choosing one distinct mode
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in reaction to a change in a particular explanatory variable (at the mean).
– Insert Table 7 around here. –
Regression results confirm that our exclusion restrictions jointly explain entry
choices quite well, and are thus valid. Banks are more likely to be active in coun-
tries with a WTO free trade agreement and in countries with a more open capi-
tal account as indicated by the Chinn-Ito index. Note that the index also contains
capital account restrictions regarding commercial banking, which would therefore
violate the independence requirement for valid exclusion restrictions by construc-
tion. Therefore, we consider individual CA indicators jointly in column (5) except
those concerning commercial banking. Recall that a value of ”one” indicates that
CA restrictions are in place with country j at time t. The index components for in-
dicators measuring ease of access to debt instruments (money market, bond market,
collective investment) carry a negative coefficient. Equity-related components (eq-
uity, FDI) exhibit positive coefficients. This is reminiscent of a substitution effect
as equity capital maybe replaced by debt in these countries.
4.2. Baseline regression results
Bank productivity measured has a positive impact on banks’ selection into for-
eign markets. This positive productivity effect is largely independent from the way
we measure capital and trade openness or which additional controls to include.
The positive impact of bank productivity is confirmed by results using alterna-
tive measures of bank productivity such as those suggested by Olley-Pakes (OP),
Levinsohn-Petrin (LP), or a simple measure of labor productivity (MPL). Our pre-
ferred specification is the one using OP estimate because it explicitly relies on
parent bank exits due to mergers among German banks. In each case, the exclusion
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restrictions are individually and jointly highly significant. The explanatory power
of the ordered probit model is quite high with a pseudo-R2 of 40% in Table 6. 16
Results reported in Tables 6 and 7 confirm that more complex, fixed-cost inten-
sive modes of bank internationalization require higher productivity. There are four
aspects of our empirical results confirming this conclusion.
First, all cut-offs µ for the extensive margin are significantly different from zero,
indicating a hierarchy of internationalization modes. Higher fixed costs of more
complex activities abroad appear in the higher cut-off values. Simple t-tests show
that the cut-offs differ significantly.
Second, the estimated cut-offs increase more in absolute terms when we move
from Mode 1 to Mode 2a compared with the move from Mode 2a to Mode 2b.
Considering the interval length relative to a particular coefficient such as the one
for productivity (µk+1−µk)/αω, productivity must increase significantly for a bank
to reach the next category. Opening a subsidiary does not require much higher
productivity as the bank already maintains a branch in a specific country (transition
from Mode 2a to 2b). The additionally required productivity is considerably higher
if the bank moves from Mode 1 (international assets held domestically) to Modes
2a or 2b (foreign affiliates): (µ2a−µ1)/αω > (µ2b−µ2a)/αω.
Third, the correction term in the outcome equation shown is statistically signif-
icant (Table 8), and it does not matter how we measure the intensive margin (log
levels or shares in total assets). Therefore, neglecting selection into a particular
mode of internationalization generates a significant bias. This result is important
16 Even for the sparsely populated modes 2a and 2b, individual discrete models shows areas
under the receiver operating characteristics curve of around 75%, i.e. a good ability of the
discrete model to discriminate events and non-events correctly. The explanatory power for
the intensive margin is of a similar magnitude with R2 of around 35%.
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because most previous studies focus on internationally active banks only.
– Insert Table 8 around here. –
Fourth, productivity has a positive and significant impact. This result is robust
to adding other bank-level variables related to productivity such as size or return
on equity. The result that larger and more profitable banks expand abroad is in line
with prior literature pertaining to international banking.
**** Die folgenden beiden Abstze habe ich aus dem Schreiben an den Referee
genommen. Bitte prfen. ****
To interpret our results, note that the variable controlling for the size of the
parent bank is a quintile indicator in the spirit of Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007),
and it captures the volume of domestic operations of the parent bank. Hence, we
explain the (absolute) volume of foreign activity while explicitly controlling for the
correlation between size and productivity of the domestic bank.
To account for the fact that normalization may matter, we re-estimate the model
using two additional dependent variables: Table 8 also specifies the share of for-
eign assets in country j as a share of gross domestic total assets as well as the share
of foreign assets in country j of total foreign assets as dependent variables in the
outcome equation. The first of these ratios is a measure of the degree of interna-
tionalization, the second is a proxy for the composition of the foreign portfolio. We
find that productivity affects the volume of foreign activities but not the share of
these activities relative to domestic or foreign assets. One explanation is that the
size dummies pick up productivity effects and that the model is over-specified if
we use a scaled dependent variable and include both, size and productivity. Size,
in contrast, has a significant impact on all measures of internationalization: larger
banks have larger volumes of foreign assets, larger volumes relative to total assets,
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and smaller shares in each foreign country (i.e. more diversified portfolios).
*** Ende Einschub ***
4.2.1. Does risk aversion matter?
We also investigate whether banks’ risk aversion affects internationalization
choices. Risk aversion cannot be observed directly. But the CAMEL profile con-
tains four indirect measures of bank risk: Banks with a low degree of capitalization,
low hidden reserves, high non-performing loans, and low loan-loss provisions have
higher levels of risk which would reflect, ceteris paribus, a lower degree of risk
aversion.
Our results confirm that risk aversion is important. Banks that are willing to take
on higher risks are more likely to be active internationally. The signs for capitaliza-
tion and reserves are negative and significant for the extensive margin. The picture
changes for the intensive margin. The positive signs for loan-loss provisions and
the negative sign for non-performing loans suggest less risk-averse (more stable)
banks to do more business. Overall, our results indicate that the decision to venture
abroad is positively affected by a low degree of risk aversion. Once being active
abroad, less risky banks generate higher business volumes.
Various dummy variables are included to capture heterogeneity across banks
in terms of banking groups and locations. An indicator variable for banks located
in East Germany accounts for the lower degree of international integration of this
region compared with the German average. Banks headquartered in East Germany
are significantly less active in international markets. Given that a bank located in
the East has invested abroad, the volume of activity is above average. A possible
explanation could be the follow-your customer motive: because only a few East
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German banks are active internationally, the demand for banking services from
home country clients is concentrated on these banks.
Throughout, we include banking group dummies to distinguish large banks,
commercial banks, and savings banks from cooperative banks, as the omitted cat-
egory. These dummies are significant but are not reported to conserve on space.
Large, commercial banks are more likely to go abroad and to hold more foreign
assets than cooperative banks. Savings banks are less likely to do go and hold large
volumes.
4.2.2. Foreign market size
Countries with larger and more developed markets are more attractive destina-
tions for international banks, so we expect a positive sign for market size and gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita. We also include total German FDI as a proxy
for real integration and the demand for financial services by German firms abroad,
which we anticipate will have a positive impact.
We consistently find a positive impact of market size on the extensive margin.
GDP, GDP per capita, and German FDI are positive and significant. The effects
of GDP per capita and German FDI are positive and significant for the intensive
margin as well. The volume of foreign assets correlates negatively with market size
(GDP), because we control for the volume of FDI. If we drop FDI, we estimate
a positive and significant coefficient. In this sense, our results confirm studies that
indicate a link between trade and financial integration (??).
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4.2.3. Information cost
For international banks, the costs of gathering information are important. In the
international finance literature, geographical distance between two countries is of-
ten used to proxy for such information costs (??). Providing financial services to
more distant markets or setting up distant foreign affiliates is more costly than do-
ing business in nearby markets. Distance yields the expected negative sign for the
extensive margin. **** Der folgende Satz komme sehr unvermittelt. Besser erkl-
ren oder streichen **** When distance increases by 1%, GDP increases by 2.4%
(−βˆDist/βˆGDP) for a bank that chooses the same mode of entry. Regarding the in-
tensive margin, distance has the expected negative impact as well.
As an additional proxy of information costs, we specify a composite index for
the level of institutional quality (??). A higher value indicates better institutional
quality. We expect a positive sign, which is confirmed for the extensive and the
intensive margin.
International trade (or banking) literature using bilateral data often includes ad-
ditional dummies, such as the presence of a common border or a common lan-
guage. We do not include such variables because we use information for only one
source country of international assets. Language or border dummies would thus be
collinear with country fixed effects or geographic distance.
4.2.4. Macroeconomic portfolio effects
To account for portfolio effects, we use the standard deviation of GDP growth
(growth volatility) in each host country j, computed over the past five years. 17 We
17 We compute growth volatility and growth correlations on the basis of residual GDP
growth, regressed on a full set of time-fixed effects, to account for general macroeconomic
developments that may influence GDP growth.
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expect a negative sign. To measure the correlation between domestic and foreign
returns, we use the growth correlation of German and foreign GDP growth rates for
rolling windows of five-year periods. We expect a negative sign as well, because
higher correlations imply less potential for diversification. A dummy for countries
in the Euro area provides a proxy of the (absence of) exchange rate risk.
Our results support previous studies in the sense that we find a positive impact
of correlation on the intensive margin. This “correlation puzzle” is also reported by
? for equity markets and ? for international banking. Volatility, in turn, reduces the
likelihood of foreign activities but it has has no significant influence on the volume
of these activities abroad.
4.2.5. Fixed costs of foreign activity
As a first proxy for the fixed costs of foreign activities, we include a measure
for activity restrictions faced by banks. This is a discrete measure which indicates
restrictions on services and products that banks are allowed to offer and restrictions
on non-financial firm ownership and control (?). We expect a negative sign because
tighter activity restrictions deter foreign activity. More stringent capital regulations
should have a qualitatively similar negative effect.
Tighter activity restrictions and capital regulations have the expected negative
impact on the extensive margin. The impact of regulatory restrictions on the volume
of activities is positive: Banks that entered a particular foreign market have a larger
volume of activities there. This positive effect is driven by the group of large banks.
For other banking groups, activity and capital restrictions have a negative impact
on entry probabilities and the volume of activities whenever they are significantly
different from zero.
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At the country-level, we also control for banking market concentration. We find
no significant impact on entry but a negative effect on volumes of activity. Control-
ling for other country-specific features, an offshore dummy yields a negative sign,
a result which is driven by the cooperative banks. For the other banking groups, the
offshore dummy has the expected positive sign.
4.3. Robustness
We perform several robustness tests. Results consistently confirm the impact of
productivity on international banking: The estimated cut-offs are significant, the
interval length relative to the productivity coefficient declines for more complex
modes of activities, and productivity and size have positive and significant impacts.
We test the robustness of our results in six steps.
First, we estimate the model year-by-year, and the result concerning productivity
remain intact.
Second, instead of clustering at the bank-country level, we cluster the standard
errors at the bank and country level separately and we then bootstrap standard errors
to consider productivity as a generated regressor. The findings are robust to these
variations.
Third, when estimating a bank-country fixed effects panel for the intensive mar-
gin, bank productivity is insignificant. This is due to relatively little within-sample
variation in bank productivity left, which is picked up by the fixed effects. The
results for size and the correction term do not change.
Fourth, we conduct the test suggested by ? to account for endogenous regres-
sors in the outcome equation as well as heterogeneously distributed and serially
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dependent error terms in the selection and outcome equation. For this purpose,
we estimate the extensive margin year-by-year and add time averages of the bank-
level variables. We compute the correction terms separately for each year and in-
clude them in the intensive margin equation. The productivity, core bank-level,
and macro-level covariates preserve their significance, and results are qualitatively
identical to those reported previously.
Fifth, pooling across countries at different stages of development might affect
our results. Therefore, we re-estimate the model for OECD countries only. The
main results for the bank-level variables are similar.
Finally, our focus on productivity and risk may ignore that smaller (savings and
cooperative) banks are not as active internationally, despite being potentially very
productive. Such a pattern could result from legal barriers to operate abroad or
because these banks have access to international markets through their head insti-
tutions (e.g., the Landesbanken for savings banks). We thus split the sample into
different banking groups: large, commercial, savings, and cooperative banks.
– Insert Table 9 around here. –
Productivity has a similar qualitative effect for small and large banks (Table 9).
But an increase in productivity has a much greater impact on both extensive and
intensive margins for smaller than for larger banks. Productivity has no significant
impact only for smaller commercial banks. This group includes private banks that
often focus on specific segments of the German domestic banking market.
With regard to the risk results, smaller banks might be different because, for
example, savings banks are government-owned and subject to implicit and explicit
guarantees. Table 9 does not indicate that the degree of risk aversion of government
and privately owned banks exerts a systematically different impact on internation-
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alization patterns. If anything, more risk-averse, large banks are more likely to enter
foreign markets, though they engage in lower volumes of activities.
5. Conclusion
The impact of size and productivity on the internationalization of non-financial
firms is a stylized fact in international economics. We study the impact of size and
productivity for bank internationalization. We use a novel, bank-level dataset with
detailed information about the location, mode, and the volume of banks’ foreign ac-
tivities. We distinguish purely domestic banks, banks that hold international assets,
banks with foreign branches, and banks with foreign subsidiaries.
We model the internationalization decision of banks in a two-step empirical
model. First, we estimate bank-level productivity by applying the models of ? and
? to the banking industry. Second, we model the extensive and intensive margins
of foreign activity with a selection models enriched by an ordered probit model to
account explicitly for the hierarchy of different foreign activity modes.
Our results reveal similarities between the internationalization patterns of banks
and non-financial firms. In terms of bank-level determinants of internationalization,
only the largest banks set up foreign affiliates. More costly modes of international-
ization require higher productivity. Productivity affects selection into foreign status
which, in turn, has a significant impact on the volume of international bank activi-
ties.
In terms of country-level determinants of internationalization, gravity variables
are important for banks just as they are for non-financial firms. Greater distances
discourage international banking, larger and more developed markets promote in-
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ternational banking, and activity restrictions deter banks. Taken together, our results
show that policies affecting foreign entry will have a disproportionately large effect
on the volumes of international banking activities.
We also highlight two noteworthy differences between international banking and
non-financial firms. First, bank-level risk factors affect bank internationalization.
More risk-averse banks are less likely to expand abroad, and they have larger vol-
umes of activities. Second, smaller banks typically hold foreign assets in at least
one market whereas small, non-financial firms tend to be purely domestically ori-
ented. This suggests lower fixed costs of holding international assets compared with
selling or sourcing abroad.
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6. Figures
Fig. 1. Volumes of investment
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7. Tables
Table 1
Theoretical predictions and measurement
Expected Signs
Parameter Measurement Extensive Intensive Mode 2 >
margin margin Mode 1?
Bank level
Bank productivity ωi Productivity, cost-to-
income ratio, return on
equity, size
+ + +
Bank risk aversion λi High risk aversion:
Capitalization, re-
serves, loan-loss
provisions
– – –
Low risk aversion:
Non-performing loans
– – –
Country level
Fixed costs of foreign
activity Fj()
Activity restrictions,
capital restrictions
– 0 –
Expected returns r∗L GDP, GDP per capita,
German FDI
+ + +
Information costs τ j Distance, institutional
quality
– – +
Country risk σ∗j GDP growth volatility – – –
Return correlations Correlation between
domestic and foreign
GDP growth
– – –
Notes: The column labelled Extensive margin indicates expected signs for the parameters
discussed in Section 2 for the likelihood of operating in foreign banking markets. The
column labelled Intensive margin indicates the expected effects on the volume of foreign
assets conditional on foreign presence. The column labelled Mode 2 > Mode 1 indicates
the expectation of the parameter effect to be larger for foreign presence via affiliates
compared to cross-border activity.
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Table 2
Modes of internationalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mode Description Number
of bank-
year-
country
observa-
tions
% Number
of banks
% Average
num-
ber of
foreign
coun-
tries
0 No foreign activity 249,410 72.55 19 0.85 0
1 International assets 93,684 27.25 2,143 96.27 14
2a Foreign branches 447 0.13 27 1.21 1.41
2b Foreign subsidiaries 229 0.07 37 1.66 3.05
Notes: Data are based on the full dataset of 2,226 banks, 35 countries, and 5 years (2002–
2006). Columns 1 and 2 reflect the full, expanded dataset using all bank-country-year
combinations, Columns 3 and 4 use the dataset collapsed by banks. Column 5 shows the
average number of countries in which banks in each mode are active. Mode 0 indicates
that there are no activities of bank i in country j in year t.
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Table 3
Bank production function estimates
Variable Estimator Descriptive
OP LP OLS statistics
ln Employees X1 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.577*** Mean 271
(0.057) (0.049) (0.010) SD 1,188
ln Borrowed funds X2 0.405*** 0.404*** 0.526*** Mean 1,258
(0.067) (0.067) (0.007) SD 10,329
ln Fixed assets K 0.209*** 0.240*** -0.035*** Mean 15
(0.051) (0.032) (0.007) SD 56
Constant -0.129***
(0.030)
Dependent: Lending Y Mean 1,334
SD 11,667
Notes: The sample comprises 12,569 observations for 2,439 banks between 2000 and 2006. All
monetary volumes are in million euro. Employees are full-time equivalents. Borrowed funds are the
sum of deposits and other debt liabilities. Time-fixed effects are included, but not reported. Standard
errors in parantheses for the ? (OP) and ? (LP) estimation of parameters are bootstrapped. Robust
standard errors for ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations.
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Table 4
CAMEL profile and productivity by internationalization mode
Domestic International assets Foreign branches Subsidiaries All banks
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Productivity estimates
OP 1.88 0.54 2.15 0.63 3.79 0.85 3.70 0.78 1.96 0.59
LP 11.78 25.63 19.66 33.99 115.53 60.76 112.29 61.6 13.56 28.13
MPL 0.27 0.12 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.27 0.11
Panel B: CAMEL covariates
Capitalization 5.85 3.11 5.42 2.62 4.1 3.4 3.78 4.46 5.76 3.02
Cost-income ratio 44.1 9.17 41.07 10.56 25.65 14.69 26.23 12.09 43.45 9.58
Hidden reserves 1.41 1.04 1.34 1.05 0.17 0.29 0.16 0.24 1.39 1.04
Loan-loss provisions 5.4 7.83 5.17 10.61 2.94 4.2 2.54 2.88 5.35 8.46
Non-performing loans 0.96 1.21 0.97 1.03 0.81 0.86 0.66 0.61 0.96 1.18
Return on Equity 10.52 16.32 10.98 14.58 7.5 17.76 5.69 14.63 10.61 15.98
Notes: Descriptive statistics of parent bank-specific variables, measured in percentages except for productivity. Productivity
descriptives in panel A pertain to 2,226 banks and 9,822 observations between 2002 and 2006 that are used to estimate
Equations (8a) and (8b). The sample in panel B consists of 12,569 observations for 2,439 banks between 2000 and 2006.
Parent banks are sorted by their mode of internationalization: Mode 1 (International assets), Mode 2a (Foreign branches), and
Mode 2b (Branches and subsidiaries). OP denotes productivity estimates obtained as in ?, LP indicates productivity as in ?.
MPL is labor productivity measured as full-time equivalents per million Euros of gross total assets of the parent bank. All
variables are defined in Appendix B.
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Table 5
Summary statistics of country-specific variables
Unit Mean SD Percentiles
1st 99th
Panel A: Exclusion restrictions
WTO free trade Score 0.258 0.438 0 1
Chinn-Ito capital account (CA) openess Index 1.510 1.311 -1.169 2.439
CA equity Score 0.437 0.496 0 1
CA money market Score 0.437 0.496 0 1
CA bond market Score 0.396 0.489 0 1
CA collective investment Score 0.407 0.491 0 1
CA commercial banks Score 0.360 0.480 0 1
CA FDI Score 0.383 0.486 0 1
Panel B: country covariates
Activity restrictions Score 8.886 2.516 4.000 14.000
Capital restrictions Score 5.486 1.556 2.000 8.000
Institutional quality Score 3.529 0.513 2.183 4.500
Gross domestic product (GDP) bn USD in logs 26.177 1.486 22.983 30.087
GDP per capita tds USD in logs 9.271 1.283 6.183 10.793
German foreign direct investment (FDI) bn EUR in logs 14.827 2.204 7.810 19.331
GDP growth correlation % 0.407 0.474 -0.803 0.988
Volatility of foreign GDP % 1.973 1.608 0.418 7.417
Distance Kilometers 8.104 1.150 5.864 9.805
Banking market concentration % 0.660 0.214 0.229 0.993
Offshore 0/1 indicator 0.057 0.232 0.000 1.000
Less developed country (LDC) 0/1 indicator 0.629 0.483 0.000 1.000
Financial center 0/1 indicator 0.057 0.232 0.000 1.000
Euro area 0/1 indicator 0.229 0.420 0.000 1.000
Notes: The sample comprises 343,770 bank-year-country observations pertaining to 35 countries
from 2001 until 2006. The WTO free trade agreement indicator measures whether Germany (or
equivalently) the European Union has either signed a free-trade agreement with the respective
foreign country or whether the foreign country is a member state of the European Union. Data on
the individual Capital Account (CA) restrictions and the index draw on ?. All variables are defined
in Appendix B.
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Table 6
Baseline regression results extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Olley and Pakes (1996) productivity (OP) and exclusion restrictions Alternative productivity
None CAO index WTO Both OP LP MPL
Productivity and selection
Olley-Pakes (1996) 0.2831*** 0.2800*** 0.2813*** 0.2773*** 0.2787***
productivity (OP) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) 0.0021***
productivity (LP) (0.000)
Labor productivity 0.1382***
(FTE/GTA) (MPL) (0.313)
Chinn-Ito CA Index 0.0184*** 0.0679***
(0.005) (0.006)
WTO free trade 0.3383*** 0.4092*** 0.3252*** 0.3240*** 0.3414***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
CA equity 0.3744*** 0.3737*** 0.3815***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
CA money market -0.2157*** -0.2153*** -0.2174***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
CA bond market -0.1076*** -0.1070*** -0.1083***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
CA collective investment -0.0607*** -0.0601*** -0.0632***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
CA FDI 0.1769*** 0.1748*** 0.1832***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Bank-specific covariates
Size quintile indicator 0.3673*** 0.3670*** 0.3685*** 0.3686*** 0.3686*** 0.4110*** -0.0157
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)
Cost-Income Ratio 0.0025*** 0.0022*** 0.0026*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** -0.0020** -0.0210***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Return on Equity 0.0006* 0.0008** 0.0006* 0.0007** 0.0007* 0.0008** 0.0009**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capitalization -0.0210*** -0.0207*** -0.0205*** -0.0202*** -0.0202*** -0.0228*** -0.0112***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Hidden Reserves -0.0224*** -0.0224*** -0.0218*** -0.0218*** -0.0217*** -0.0260*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Non-performing Loans -0.0036 -0.0059 -0.0031 -0.0053 -0.0056 -0.005 -0.0307***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Loan-Loss Provisions 0.0007 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0036***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
East Germany -0.1637*** -0.1479*** -0.1635*** -0.1485*** -0.1481*** -0.2678*** -0.2814***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
–continued on next page –
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Olley and Pakes (1996) productivity (OP) and exclusion restrictions Alternative productivity
None CAO index WTO Both OP LP MPL
Country-specific covariates
Activity restrictions -0.0865*** -0.0596*** -0.0976*** -0.0779*** -0.0611*** -0.0612*** -0.0614***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Capital restrictions -0.1093*** -0.0884*** -0.1178*** -0.0989*** -0.0971*** -0.0971*** -0.1006***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Institutional quality 0.0148 0.0924*** 0.1259*** 0.1953*** 0.1673*** 0.1675*** 0.1748***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Gross domestic 0.1968*** 0.1375*** 0.2220*** 0.1693*** 0.1766*** 0.1768*** 0.1791***
product (GDP) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
GDP per capita 0.1366*** 0.0930*** 0.0556*** -0.0024 0.0840*** 0.0829*** 0.0826***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
German foreign direct 0.2793*** 0.3242*** 0.2778*** 0.3250*** 0.3007*** 0.2990*** 0.3133***
investment (FDI) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP growth correlation 0.1251*** 0.1002*** 0.0439*** -0.0018 0.0157 0.0154 0.0151
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Volatility of foreign GDP -0.0750*** -0.0752*** -0.0920*** -0.0798*** -0.1007*** -0.1003*** -0.1037***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance -0.3420*** -0.3452*** -0.3674*** -0.3685*** -0.4266*** -0.4256*** -0.4365***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Banking market 0.1340*** 0.2586*** 0.0025 0.1394*** -0.0196 -0.0201 -0.0157
concentration (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Intercepts and fixed effects
Offshore -0.1430*** -0.2162*** -0.0441 -0.1364*** -0.0698* -0.0700* -0.0653*
(0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Less developed -0.3958*** -0.3670*** -0.1706*** -0.1476*** -0.2617*** -0.2605*** -0.2577***
country (LDC) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Financial center 0.2985*** 0.3513*** 0.1002*** 0.1520*** 0.1691*** 0.1671*** 0.1982***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Euro area -0.4901*** -0.4305*** -0.4593*** -0.4164*** -0.3447*** -0.3446*** -0.3517***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
µ1 8.7408*** 8.1337*** 8.7703*** 8.2634*** 8.2471*** 7.5869*** 8.8330***
(0.201) (0.205) (0.204) (0.206) (0.213) (0.209) (0.212)
µ2 12.3186*** 11.7420*** 12.3477*** 11.8780*** 11.8528*** 11.1732*** 12.6274***
(0.209) (0.213) (0.212) (0.214) (0.221) (0.218) (0.222)
µ3 12.7250*** 12.1458*** 12.7506*** 12.2778*** 12.2528*** 11.5677*** 13.0967***
(0.214) (0.218) (0.217) (0.219) (0.225) (0.222) (0.228)
Pseudo-R2 0.3993 0.4078 0.3971 0.406 0.4068 0.4047 0.4258
Notes: The sample comprises 343,770 bank-year-country observations in up to 35 countries between 2001 and 2006. Banking-group
and time-fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-country level. All variables are lagged
by one period. The selection equation (extensive margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model. The dependent variable is the mode
of foreign presence. OP denotes productivity obtained by the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). LP denotes productivity
obtained by the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). MPL denotes labor productivity measured as full-time equivalents per million
Euros of total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at
10% level. 38
Table 7
Coefficient estimates and elasticities per foreign activity mode
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient Elasticities per mode
0 1 2a 2b
Productivity and selection
Olley-Pakes (1996) 0.2787*** -0.1669*** 0.8118*** 2.5653*** 2.8096***
productivity (OP) (0.017) (0.010) (0.049) (0.152) (0.171)
WTO free trade 0.3252*** -0.0265*** 0.1287*** 0.4067*** 0.4454***
(0.022) (0.002) (0.009) (0.027) (0.030)
CA equity 0.3744*** -0.0481*** 0.2340*** 0.7394*** 0.8098***
(0.025) (0.003) (0.015) (0.050) (0.054)
CA money market -0.2157*** 0.0277*** -0.1348*** -0.4259*** -0.4664***
(0.017) (0.002) (0.011) (0.034) (0.037)
CA bond market -0.1076*** 0.0126*** -0.0614*** -0.1941*** -0.2126***
(0.022) (0.003) (0.012) (0.040) (0.043)
CA collective investment -0.0607*** 0.0072*** -0.0351*** -0.1110*** -0.1216***
(0.015) (0.002) (0.008) (0.027) (0.029)
CA FDI 0.1769*** -0.0197*** 0.0959*** 0.3029*** 0.3317***
(0.017) (0.002) (0.009) (0.029) (0.031)
Bank-specific covariates
Size quintile indicator 0.3686*** -0.3391*** 1.6494*** 5.2118*** 5.7082***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.029) (0.110) (0.121)
Cost-Income Ratio 0.0023*** -0.0312*** 0.1515*** 0.4789*** 0.5245***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.055) (0.174) (0.192)
Return on Equity 0.0007* -0.0023* 0.0110* 0.0346* 0.0379*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.020)
Capitalization -0.0202*** 0.0356*** -0.1733*** -0.5475*** -0.5997***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.026) (0.081) (0.088)
Hidden Reserves -0.0217*** 0.0092*** -0.0449*** -0.1420*** -0.1555***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.037) (0.040)
Non-performing Loans -0.0056 0.0016 -0.0079 -0.0251 -0.0275
(0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.029) (0.032)
Loan-Loss Provisions 0.0007 -0.0011 0.0052 0.0165 0.0181
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.019)
East Germany -0.1481*** 0.0042*** -0.0204*** -0.0645*** -0.0706***
(0.020) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient Elasticities per mode
0 1 2a 2b
Country-specific covariates
Activity restrictions -0.0611*** 0.1652*** -0.8035*** -2.5389*** -2.7807***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.060) (0.189) (0.211)
Capital restrictions -0.0971*** 0.1592*** -0.7745*** -2.4473*** -2.6804***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.035) (0.113) (0.127)
Institutional quality 0.1673*** -0.1819*** 0.8850*** 2.7965*** 3.0629***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.155) (0.487) (0.538)
Gross domestic 0.1766*** -1.4126*** 6.8712*** 21.7119*** 23.7798***
product (GDP) (0.011) (0.092) (0.437) (1.346) (1.566)
GDP per capita 0.0840*** -0.2390*** 1.1625*** 3.6733*** 4.0232***
(0.016) (0.047) (0.227) (0.714) (0.787)
German foreign 0.3007*** -1.3593*** 6.6123*** 20.8936*** 22.8836***
direct investment (FDI) (0.009) (0.039) (0.214) (0.722) (0.748)
GDP growth correlation 0.0157 -0.0020 0.0097 0.0306 0.0335
(0.017) (0.002) (0.010) (0.033) (0.036)
Volatility of foreign GDP -0.1007*** 0.0617*** -0.3002*** -0.9486*** -1.0390***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.040) (0.044)
Distance -0.4266*** 1.0585*** -5.1489*** -16.2697*** -17.8193***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.105) (0.374) (0.419)
Banking market -0.0196 0.0039 -0.0192 -0.0605 -0.0663
concentration (0.035) (0.007) (0.034) (0.109) (0.119)
Intercepts and fixed effects
Offshore -0.0698* 0.0013* -0.0063* -0.0199* -0.0218*
(0.038) (0.001) (0.003) (0.011) (0.012)
Less developed -0.2617*** 0.0509*** -0.2476*** -0.7824*** -0.8570***
country (LDC) (0.037) (0.007) (0.035) (0.109) (0.121)
Financial center 0.1691*** -0.0031*** 0.0152*** 0.0482*** 0.0527***
(0.032) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010)
Euro area -0.3447*** 0.0223*** -0.1087*** -0.3435*** -0.3762***
(0.019) (0.001) (0.006) (0.020) (0.022)
µ1 8.2471***
(0.213)
µ2 11.8528***
(0.221)
µ3 12.2528***
(0.225)
(Pseudo-)R2 0.4068
Notes: The sample comprises 343,770 bank-year-country observations for the extensive margin and
91,108 observations for the intensive margin in up to 35 countries between 2001 and 2006. Banking-group
and time-fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-country level.
All variables are lagged by one period. The selection equation (extensive margin) is estimated as an or-
dered probit model. The dependent variable is the mode of foreign presence. Productivity is obtained by
the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). All variables are defined in Appendix B ***Significant
at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.40
Table 8
Foreign activity volume conditional on foreign presence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign assets (FA) (log-level) FAi jt/GTAit (ratio) FAi jt/T FAit
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity
Productivity and selection
Correction term λ 2.858*** 0.4102*** 1.834*** 3.0899*** 5.038*** 0.4417***
(0.083) (0.012) (0.231) (0.352) (0.502) (0.044)
Olley-Pakes (1996) 0.930*** 0.4189*** 0.036 0.1907 -0.243 -0.0669
productivity (OP) (0.051) (0.023) (0.088) (0.468) (0.212) (0.058)
Bank-specific covariates
Size quintile indicator 0.940*** 0.7034*** 0.294*** 2.5836*** -1.491*** -0.6816***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.053) (0.436) (0.139) (0.063)
Cost-Income Ratio -0.055*** -0.4721*** -0.022*** -2.2729*** -0.028** -0.1494**
(0.003) (0.024) (0.004) (0.361) (0.013) (0.068)
Return on Equity -0.000 -0.0010 0.004* 0.0972* -0.001 -0.0014
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.054) (0.006) (0.008)
Capitalization -0.036*** -0.0413*** 0.022 0.2977 -0.036 -0.0247
(0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.319) (0.047) (0.033)
Hidden Reserves -0.062*** -0.0176*** -0.035*** -0.1156*** -0.041 -0.0071
(0.018) (0.005) (0.012) (0.039) (0.088) (0.015)
Non-performing Loans -0.124*** -0.0250*** 0.045 0.1056 -0.180 -0.0221
(0.023) (0.005) (0.062) (0.146) (0.149) (0.018)
Loan-Loss Provisions 0.013*** 0.0137*** 0.002 0.0300 0.003 0.0017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.045) (0.009) (0.006)
East Germany 0.625*** 0.0107*** -0.044 -0.0089 0.089 0.0009
(0.070) (0.001) (0.065) (0.013) (0.311) (0.003)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign assets (FA) (level) FAi jt/GTAit (ratio) FAi jt/T FAit
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity
Country-specific covariates
Activity restrictions 0.066*** 0.1072*** -0.067*** -1.2733*** 0.431*** 0.4282***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.012) (0.211) (0.056) (0.055)
Capital restrictions -0.019 -0.0218 -0.093*** -1.2636*** -0.539*** -0.3819***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.222) (0.067) (0.047)
Institutional quality 0.487*** 0.3849*** 0.309*** 2.8691*** 8.079*** 3.9034***
(0.099) (0.078) (0.062) (0.596) (0.492) (0.233)
Gross domestic -0.996*** -5.6220*** 0.029 1.8879 -4.310*** -14.8612***
product (GDP) (0.038) (0.214) (0.028) (1.812) (0.181) (0.608)
GDP per capita 0.793*** 1.6680*** -0.015 -0.3633 -1.302*** -1.6725***
(0.075) (0.158) (0.076) (1.877) (0.316) (0.405)
German foreign direct 1.502*** 5.1525*** 0.511*** 20.5554*** 4.582*** 9.6027***
investment (FDI) (0.009) (0.109) (0.046) (1.607) (0.149) (0.298)
GDP growth correlation 0.142** 0.0190** 0.079** 0.1242** -0.607** -0.0497**
(0.060) (0.008) (0.040) (0.063) (0.239) (0.020)
Volatility of foreign GDP 0.016 0.0047 -0.025 -0.0900 -0.317*** -0.0588***
(0.020) (0.006) (0.027) (0.096) (0.082) (0.015)
Distance -0.078** -0.1206** -0.420*** -7.5948*** -0.737*** -0.6946***
(0.031) (0.048) (0.052) (0.832) (0.140) (0.132)
Banking market concentration -2.673*** -0.3593*** -0.194*** -0.3052*** -8.909*** -0.7315***
(0.133) (0.018) (0.065) (0.104) (0.574) (0.047)
Intercepts and fixed effects
Offshore -1.678*** -0.0057*** -0.707*** -0.0280*** -7.301*** -0.0150***
(0.148) (0.000) (0.122) (0.004) (0.537) (0.001)
Less developed -1.753*** -0.3273*** -0.181 -0.3968 -2.596*** -0.2960***
country (LDC) (0.173) (0.032) (0.218) (0.481) (0.764) (0.087)
Financial center 1.436*** 0.0572*** 0.098* 0.0459* -0.345 -0.0084
(0.069) (0.003) (0.052) (0.024) (0.299) (0.007)
Euro area 2.012*** 0.1333*** -0.221*** -0.1718*** 6.514*** 0.2636***
(0.064) (0.004) (0.078) (0.057) (0.292) (0.012)
Constant -5.425*** -7.092*** 47.506***
(1.018) (1.548) (4.740)
(Pseudo-)R2 0.357 0.231 0.384
Notes: The sample comprises 343,770 bank-year-country observations for the extensive margin and 91,108 observations
for the intensive margin in up to 35 countries between 2001 and 2006. Banking-group and time-fixed effects are included
but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-country level. All variables are lagged by one period. The
outcome equation (intensive margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the log volume of international
assets unless noted otherwise. GTA denotes gross total domestic assets, FAi jt denotes foreign assets of bank i in country j,
and T FAit denotes total foreign assets of bank i aggregated across all countries j. Productivity is obtained by the method
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). All variables are defined in Appendix B ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at
5% level. * Significant at 10% level.
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Table 9
Extensive and intensive margins of foreign activity per banking group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Large banks Commercials Savings Cooperatives
EM IM EM IM EM IM EM IM
Productivity and selection
Correction term 1.138*** 2.434*** 2.390*** 4.278***
(0.109) (0.114) (0.274) (0.156)
Olley-Pakes (1996) 0.621*** 1.648*** 0.019 -0.087 0.729*** 2.028*** 0.630*** 1.759***
productivity (OP) (0.160) (0.241) (0.015) (0.059) (0.042) (0.161) (0.028) (0.103)
WTO free trade -0.037 0.325*** 0.349*** 0.325***
(0.218) (0.067) (0.042) (0.029)
CA equity -0.264 0.014 0.226*** 0.409***
(0.204) (0.079) (0.048) (0.030)
CA money market -0.179 -0.064 -0.213*** -0.221***
(0.143) (0.056) (0.034) (0.022)
CA bond market 0.210 0.017 -0.050 -0.059**
(0.173) (0.068) (0.041) (0.028)
CA collective investment 0.086 -0.067 -0.020 -0.070***
(0.121) (0.049) (0.028) (0.019)
CA FDI 0.277* 0.156*** 0.232*** 0.187***
(0.156) (0.051) (0.031) (0.022)
Bank-specific covariates
Size quintile indicator 1.198*** 1.720*** 1.147*** 3.118*** 0.607*** 1.293*** 0.562*** 2.114***
(0.145) (0.174) (0.040) (0.150) (0.023) (0.107) (0.017) (0.068)
Cost-Income Ratio 0.077*** -0.004 0.008*** -0.037*** -0.017*** -0.071*** 0.008*** -0.002
(0.016) (0.020) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004)
Return on Equity 0.004 -0.010 0.002*** 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.003*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Capitalization -0.055 -0.379*** -0.015*** -0.020** -0.027** -0.173*** -0.042*** -0.114***
(0.065) (0.090) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.035) (0.006) (0.020)
Hidden Reserves -0.226 -0.180 0.008 0.332*** -0.012 0.121*** 0.010 -0.037
(0.243) (0.311) (0.026) (0.077) (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) (0.025)
Non-performing Loans -0.004 -0.180 -0.008 -0.123*** 0.115*** 0.120 0.092*** 0.352***
(0.105) (0.144) (0.005) (0.025) (0.025) (0.073) (0.012) (0.037)
Loan-Loss Provisions -0.054* -0.106*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.028*** -0.039*** -0.016*** -0.084***
(0.031) (0.040) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.002) (0.006)
East Germany -0.315 -1.362*** -0.119 0.721** 0.302*** 1.564*** -0.043 0.452***
(0.213) (0.282) (0.085) (0.307) (0.044) (0.147) (0.031) (0.097)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Large banks Commercials Savings Cooperatives
EM IM EM IM EM IM EM IM
Country-specific covariates
Activity restrictions 0.098** 0.181*** -0.024* 0.022 -0.095*** 0.016 -0.048*** 0.020
(0.041) (0.052) (0.014) (0.040) (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.017)
Capital restrictions 0.014 0.117** -0.010 0.071 -0.097*** -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.071***
(0.046) (0.054) (0.014) (0.043) (0.008) (0.026) (0.005) (0.020)
Institutional quality 0.402 -0.343 0.242*** -0.296 -0.179*** -0.224 0.322*** 1.423***
(0.291) (0.358) (0.091) (0.300) (0.055) (0.175) (0.040) (0.125)
Gross domestic -0.198 -0.482*** 0.130*** -0.183 0.300*** -0.406*** 0.114*** -1.505***
product (GDP) (0.141) (0.120) (0.039) (0.114) (0.022) (0.077) (0.014) (0.046)
GDP per capita 0.190 1.360*** 0.072 0.485** 0.240*** 1.560*** -0.010 0.690***
(0.177) (0.242) (0.052) (0.200) (0.030) (0.136) (0.021) (0.098)
German foreign direct 0.458*** 0.875*** 0.199*** 0.820*** 0.258*** 1.046*** 0.373*** 2.320***
investment (FDI) (0.086) (0.092) (0.026) (0.082) (0.017) (0.059) (0.013) (0.050)
GDP growth -0.000 -0.135 -0.210*** -0.310* -0.195*** -0.608*** 0.195*** 1.051***
correlation (0.116) (0.191) (0.047) (0.172) (0.029) (0.101) (0.024) (0.076)
Volatility of -0.013 -0.016 -0.048*** 0.052 -0.065*** 0.065** -0.123*** -0.062**
foreign GDP (0.030) (0.053) (0.011) (0.050) (0.007) (0.030) (0.006) (0.030)
Distance -0.069 -0.421*** -0.315*** -0.667*** -0.510*** -0.239*** -0.398*** 0.025
(0.071) (0.099) (0.025) (0.093) (0.016) (0.077) (0.011) (0.043)
Banking market 0.230 -1.757*** -0.073 -2.302*** 0.115* -2.478*** 0.004 -2.172***
concentration (0.358) (0.453) (0.118) (0.396) (0.066) (0.235) (0.046) (0.173)
Intercepts and cutoffs
Offshore 0.631** 0.781 0.245** -0.246 0.207*** -0.120 -0.384*** -3.645***
(0.267) (0.489) (0.099) (0.347) (0.060) (0.207) (0.062) (0.245)
Less developed 0.022 -0.275 -0.078 -0.326 -0.500*** -3.438*** -0.085* -1.946***
country (LDC) (0.339) (0.490) (0.111) (0.457) (0.066) (0.309) (0.049) (0.229)
Financial center 0.744** 1.599*** 0.107 1.584*** 0.081 1.963*** 0.233*** 0.915***
(0.305) (0.324) (0.105) (0.267) (0.068) (0.122) (0.042) (0.083)
Euro area -0.077 0.948*** 0.111* 0.970*** -0.294*** 2.121*** -0.454*** 1.722***
(0.207) (0.206) (0.063) (0.213) (0.037) (0.115) (0.025) (0.085)
µ1 7.737*** 7.445*** 9.999*** 8.603***
(2.802) (0.735) (0.432) (0.263)
µ2 11.762*** 10.378*** 14.814*** 13.346***
(2.881) (0.755) (0.529) (0.348)
µ3 12.714*** 10.866*** 14.979***
(2.928) (0.746) (0.558)
Constant -5.692** -5.111** -14.935*** -13.283***
(2.763) (2.583) (2.416) (1.633)
Observations 3,003 2,677 22,704 8,615 78,540 27,648 219,879 52,159
Pseudo-R2 0.384 0.302 0.401 0.428
Notes: The table shows results for the extensive margin and the intensive margin per banking group in up to 35 countries between 2001
and 2006. Time-fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-country level. All variables are
lagged by one period. The selection equation (extensive margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model. The dependent variable is the
mode of foreign presence. The outcome equation (intensive margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the log volume of
international assets. Productivity is obtained by the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). For further variable descriptions, see the
Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.
44
A. Deriving the correction term
To derive the correction term, we draw on the standard bivariate normality of er-
ror terms in equations that describe the extensive and intensive margins. The start-
ing point is Equation (10):
E
(
IMi jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k
)
= αXi jt +σIME
(
ui jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k
)
, (A.1)
where k= 1,2a,2b. We assume that the errors of the extensive and intensive margin
are correlated. The conditional expectations of the error term σIME[ui jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt =
0] is then σIME[ρvi jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = 0]. Further simplification of the conditioning part
yields σIMρE[vi jt |µk−βZi jt < vi jt < µk+1−βZi jt ].
If we assume the error term follows a conditional standard normal distribution,
we can explicitly write the conditional expectation
σIMρE
(
vi jt |µk−βZi jt < vi jt < µk+1−βZi jtk
)
(A.2)
as:
µk+1−βZi jtk∫
µk−βZi jtk
vi jt f
(
vi jt |µk−βZi jt < vi jt < µk+1−βZi jtk
)
dvi jt (A.3)
Rewriting the conditional expectation when applying the definition of a con-
ditional density function yields a ratio of the density φ(vi jt) and the cumulative
density function, such that we can rewrite Equation (A.1) as
1
Φ
(
µk+1−βZi jt
)−Φ(µk−βZi jt)
µk+1−βZi jtk∫
µk−βZi jtk
vi jtφ
(
vi jt
)
dvi jt (A.4)
Now, it is possible to integrate and exploit the fact that φ′(vi jt) =−vi jtφ(vi jt):
φ
(
µk+1−βZi jt
)− (−φ(µk−βZi jt))
Φ
(
µk+1−βZi jt
)−Φ(µk−βZi jt) = φ
(
µk−βZi jt
)−φ(µk+1−βZi jt)
Φ
(
µk+1−βZi jt
)−Φ(µk−βZi jt) (A.5)
In turn, we obtain three distinct correction terms (λkOP) to address the selection
bias. Their particular shape and conditionality on the realized modes (categories
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0, 1, 2a, or 2b) of the extensive margin level distinguish our ordered probit model
from ? conventional selection equation. The conditional error term of the intensive
margin σIME[ρvi jt |Zi jt ,EMi jt = k] transforms into:
σIMρλ1i jt = σIMρ
φ
(
µ1−βZi jt
)−φ(µ2a−βZi jt)
Φ
(
µ2a−βZi jt
)−Φ(µ1−βZi jt) i f EMi jt = 1 (A.6a)
σIMρλ2ai jt = σIMρ
φ
(
µ2a−βZi jt
)−φ(µ2b−βZi jt)
Φ
(
µ2b−βZi jt
)−Φ(µ2a−βZi jt) i f EMi jt = 2a (A.6b)
σIMρλ2bi jt = σIMρ
φ
(
µ2b−βZi jt
)
1−Φ(µ2b−βZi jt) i f EMi jt = 2b (A.6c)
which results in the correction term. In the equation for the intensive margin,
σEMρ becomes part of the coefficient to estimate, whereas the regressor λki jt carries
information on the different cut-offs that characterize the extensive margin.
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B. Data Appendix
B.1. Bank-Level variables
Bank data are from unconsolidated balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and
audit reports reported annually by all banks to the German central bank (Deutsche
Bundesbank). The variables for both the productivity estimation and the CAMEL
vector are corrected for outliers by truncating them at the 1st and the 99th per-
centiles. Level variables are deflated by the consumer price index. The various
sources of country-specific variables are indicated for each variable described.
Banking groups Large banks represent the head institutions of the savings (’Lan-
desbanken’) and cooperative banks and the largest commercial banks. Commer-
cial banks are privately owned but not necessarily publicly listed banks. Savings
banks are (local) government-owned regional banks. Cooperative banks are mu-
tually owned regional banks.
Borrowed funds Sum of deposits and other debt in million euros.
CapitalizationCore Capital as a percentage of gross total assets.
Cost-to-income ratio Personnel expenditure as a percentage of total administra-
tive cost. Employees are full-time equivalents.
Equity Gross total equity in million euros.
Fixed assets Physical capital including buildings and IT capital stock, in million
euros.
Lending Total customer loans in million euros.
Loan-loss provisions Stock of loan-loss provisions as a percentage of gross total
loans.
Non-performing loans Loans with latent risks according to central bank auditors
as a percentage of total audited loans.
Productivity Empirical estimates are based on a bank production function in logs
explaining total lending as a function of fixed assets, full time equivalent em-
ployees, and borrowed funds as production factors obtained with the estimators
of ? OP and ? LP, respectively. Equity capital is specified in both approaches as
intermediate input. Exit through mergers is specified in the former method. The
third measure is observed labor productivity MPL, measured as FTE per million
euros of gross total assets.
Reserves Hidden reserves according to §340f of the German commercial code as
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a percentage of gross total assets.
Return on equity (ROE) Operating results, including net interest, fees, commis-
sions, and trading income as a percentage of equity capital.
Size Following ?, size is a quintile indicator based on the distribution of gross total
assets across all parent banks per year.
Total assets Gross total assets in million euros.
B.2. Exclusion Restrictions
Data on the exclusion restrictions draw on two sources. The World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) free trade agreement indicator is constructed from the register on
regional trade agreements as provided by the WTO website. 18 Data on the Capital
Account Openness indicator are from the most recent version of ?.
WTOfree trade Indicator of whether Germany (or the European Union) has signed
a free trade agreement with the respective country.
Capital Account Openess Index by ?, which captures the extent and intensity of
capital controls. Loans and advances to banks, firms, governments, bonds and
notes, foreign shares and other equity, participation abroad. Higher values indi-
cate more open economies.
CAequity Controls on equity purchases, sales, issuances by residents and non-
residents, or on inflow and outflow of equities. A value of ”one” indicates more
restrictions.
CAmoney Controls on money market purchases, sales, issuances by residents and
non-residents, or on inflow and outflow of money market securities. A value of
”one” indicates more restrictions.
CAbond Controls on bond purchases and sales and issuances by residents and
non-residents, or on inflow and outflow of debt securities. A value of ”one” indi-
cates more restrictions.
CAcollective investment Controls on collective investment purchases, sales, is-
suances by residents and non-residents. A value of ”one” indicates more restric-
tions.
CAFDI Controls on foreign direct investment. A value of ”one” indicates more
restrictions.
18 Available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
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B.3. Country-level variables
Activity restrictions Indicates whether banks are restricted from engaging in secu-
rities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, real estate investments,
management, and development. Higher values indicate tighter restrictions (Beck
et al. 2006).
Concentration Fraction of total assets held by the three largest banks in the econ-
omy (World Bank).
Capital regulation Combined measure of overall and initial capital stringency,
ranging from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency (Beck
at el. 2006).
Developing country Indicator variable equal to ”one” if the country is not a high-
income country, according to the income taxonomy of the Worldbank (WDI,
Worldbank).
Distance Geographic distance between Germany and host country j (CEPII).
Economic freedom Composite of 10 factors measuring institutional quality and
policies pertaining to trade, government finances, government interventions, mon-
etary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages
and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market activity; higher values
indicate better institutions (Beck et al. 2006).
FDI Aggregate volume of FDI in host country (Microdatabase Foreign Direct In-
vestment (MiDi), Deutsche Bundesbank).
Financial center Indicator variable equal to ”one” for Luxembourg, Switzerland,
and the UK, including the channel islands, following the definition of the Exter-
nal Position Report (Deutsche Bundesbank).
GDPper capita Gross domestic product in million US dollar (2000 = 100).
GDP-growth correlations: Correlation of German and destination country GDP
in the preceding five years.
Institutional quality Six dimensions of indices voice and accountability, govern-
ment effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control
of corruption (Kaufman et al. 1999, Beck et al. 2006).
Offshore destination Indicator variable equal to ”one” for Hong Kong, Singapore,
and the Philippines, following the definition of the External Position Report
(Deutsche Bundesbank).
Volatility Change of growth rate residuals, net of cyclical effects in the preceding
five-year period.
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B.4. External Position Report
Data about the international assets of German banks come from the External
Position Report (Auslandsstatus) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The data are confi-
dential and can be used on the premises of the Deutsche Bundesbank only.
International assets Loans and advances to banks, companies, governments, bonds
and notes, foreign shares and other equity, participation abroad, denominated or
converted into euro.
Branches and subsidiaries Foreign affiliates of German parent banks. Branches
do not enjoy independent legal status, whereas subsidiaries do. Assets held by
affiliates are attributed to the country in which they are located.
Countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Korea, Rep., Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Philip-
pines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States.
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